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In short, it must be expected that very few cases will arise under the
act, with the card issuer being content to bear the losses,4 ' though passing
them on in part to the consumer and the merchant through increased costs.
JOHN WOODWARD DEs
Criminal Procedure-Double Jeopardy: In the Interest of
Public Justice
The "universal maxim of the common law,"' that no one should be
twice vexed for the same cause, was elevated to a position of constitutional
.dignity by the adoption of the fifth amendment.2 Today, it is among the
most fundamental guarantees of the Bill of Rights.3 However, before a
man can "be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb"" there must have been
initial jeopardy. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in United
States ex rel. Somerville v. Illinois,5 recently considered the problem of
when and under what circumstances jeopardy is deemed to have attached
so as to bar a subsequent prosecution. Petitioner Donald Somerville was
indicted for theft on March 19, 1964. On November 1, 1965, his case
the immediate implication is that the definition can apply to only one transaction
and not to a series of transactions. From a pragmatic point of view, this is un-
tenable since it would wipe out effective limitation of liability and destroy the intent
to protect the cardholder which is the basis of the act. Testimony before the com-
mittee that entertained the bill reveals that the spokesman for the American Bankers
Association assumed the limitation to apply to a series of unauthorized uses rather
than to each unauthorized use of the card. His statement was not contradicted.
1969 Hearings 107. If this assumption is not borne out in the courts, the need for
liability insurance will be renewed.
"According to a representative of the Federal Trade Commission, earliest
indications under the act point to this result since most companies are not bothering
to meet the requirements. Raleigh News and Observer, Jan. 28, 1971, at 35, col. 3.
14 W. BLAcKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *335.
"nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb ... ." U.S. CONST. amend. V. See J. SIGLER, DOUBLE
JEOPARDY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL POLICY 1-37, 226 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as SIGLER].
'Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793-96 (1969). This case applied the
double jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment to the states through the fourteenth
amendment.
'U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
'429 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir. 1970). The Supreme Court has recently vacated
the seventh circuit's decision in Somervile and remanded the case for reconsidera-
tion in light of the decisions in United States v. Jorn, 91 S. Ct. 547 (1971), and
Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963). 39 U.S.L.W. 3436 (U.S. Apr. 6,
1971). These cases are discussed generally infra.
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came to trial, and twelve jurors were duly impaneled and sworn. The
following day the state's attorney moved for a mistrial and to nolle
prosequi on the ground that the indictment did not allege a crime and was
therefore void.6 The motion was granted over the defendant's objection.
On November 3, a corrected indictment was returned under which Somer-
ville was subsequently convicted, his claim of double jeopardy having been
rejected.7
Somerville filed a petition for habeas corpus asserting that jeopardy
had attached upon the selection and swearing of the jury and that retrial
after the discharge of the jury subjected him to double jeopardy in viola-
tion of the fifth amendment. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit affirmed the dismissal of the habeas corpus petition by the district
court, holding that the discharge of a jury impaneled and sworn under
an invalid indictment did not bar reprosecution on the ground of double
jeopardy."
Confusion has consistently surrounded the double jeopardy proscrip-
tion of the fifth amendment. Although it is one of the most litigated por-
tions of the Bill of Rights, it is extremely difficult to predict with precision
the outcome of any defense predicated upon double jeopardy.9 One of the
major areas of uncertainty is that which is concerned with the attachment
of jeopardy. While the Supreme Court has not yet ruled upon the ques-
tion raised in Somerville, an examination of prior double jeopardy de-
cisions may serve to reveal the ultimate outcome of any appeal on the issue.
A statement of what has been characterized as "the general rule" notes
that "a person is not in jeopardy until he has been arraigned on a valid in-
dictment.., and a jury has been impaneled and sworn. .. ."" Decisions
'The indictment failed to alleged intent to deprive the owner permanently of
the use or benefit of the property, an essential element of the offense sought to be
charged, and its omission rendered the indictment invalid. 429 F.2d at 1336 & n.2.
"People v. Somerville, 88 Ill. App. 2d 212, 232 N.E.2d 115 (1967), leave to
appeal denied, 37 Ill. 2d 627, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 823 (1968).
3United States ex rel. Somerville v. Illinois, 429 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir. 1970).
0 SiGLER 226.
10 McCarthy v. Zerbst, 85 F.2d 640, 642 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 610
(1936). See also Amrine v. Times, 131 F.2d 827, 834 (10th Cir. 1942). The rule
is different in a nonjury trial. There jeopardy is not deemed to have attached until
the court has begun to hear evidence. McCarthy v. Zerbst, 85 F.2d 640, 642 (10th
Cir. 1936). See also 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 241 (1961). These rules as to the
time of the attachment of jeopardy have been supported as well-founded:
By the time the jury has been sworn or evidence introduced, the accused has
been put to substantial trouble and expense and there has been considerable
investment of judicial resources. To delay attachment of jeopardy to some
later trial stage maximizes the risk of harassment of the accused and en-
ables the prosecution to escape a particular jury. On the other hand, to
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of the Supreme Court, however, tend to discount the importance of a valid
indictment. In United States v.. Ball," the defendant was tried and ac-
quitted under an indictment later adjudged "fatally defective."' 2 A new
indictment was returned against him, and he was found guilty, the court
denying his plea of former jeopardy. The Supreme Court recognized that
to allow a public officer, whose business it was to, draw a correct indictment,
to allege his own inaccuracy or neglect as a reason for a second trial was
"'like permitting a party to take advantage of his own wrong,' "18 and it
held that the verdict of acquittal was conclusive notwithstanding the in-
validity of the indictment. This view was recently reaffirmed in Benton
v. Maryland,14 in which the state's argument that one cannot be placed in
jeopardy by a void indictment was characterized as "strange . . . since
petitioner could quietly have served out his sentence under this 'void'
indictment had he not appealed .... ."15
Downum v. United States" represents a Supreme Court decision that
is factually similar to Somerville. A jury had been selected and sworn
when the prosecution hsked that it be discharged because of the absence of
a key witness. This was done over the objection of the defendant. Two
days later a second jury was impaneled, and the defendant was found guilty.
The Court reversed the conviction, holding that the defendant's retrial
subjected him to double jeopardy. The majority in Somerville made no
attempt to distinguish Downum. The dissent, however, carefully noted
the similarities and criticized the majority's departure from precedent:
Both cases were dismissed on motion of the Government because of its
own fault. In Downum, it was the failure of the Government to pro-
cure the attendance of a material witness; in the instant case, it was an
allegedly defective indictment for which it was responsible.17
advance attachment of jeopardy to an earlier point in the proceeding ...
unduly discounts the state's legitimate interest in bringing offenders to trial.
Note, Double Jeopardy: The Reprosecution Problem, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1272, 1275
(1964). The Model Penal Code suggests that jeopardy attach in all cases upon the
swearing of the first witness, evidencing the belief that there should be no distinc-
tion between jury and nonjury trials. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.08(4) (Proposed
Official Draft 1962); MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.09, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 5,
1956).163 U.S. 662 (1896).
'2 Id. at 664. The indictment had been attacked on appeal by Ball's two co-
defendants, who had been found guilty.
'a Id. at 668.
1,395 U.S. 784 (1969).
1 Id. at 796.
'1 372 U.S. 734 (1963).
429 F.2d at 1338.
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The "valued right [of an accused] to have his trial completed by a
particular tribunal""' is well recognized, and a recent decision stressed
this consideration, emphasizing "the importance to the defendant of being
able, once and for all, to conclude his confrontation -with society through
the verdict of a tribunal he might believe to b& favorably disposed to his
fate."'" Nevertheless, it is clear that in some instances a trial must be
discontinued after the jury is impaneled and sworn but before a verdict is
ieached without double jeopardy barring reprosecution. United States v.
Perez0 enunciated a rule in 1824 that has since been scrupulously fol-
lowed by the courts:
We think, that in all cases of this nature, the law has invested Courts
of justice with the authority to discharge a jury from giving any
verdict, whenever in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into
consideration; there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of
public justice would otherwise be defeated.21
This, termination prior to the verdict is no bar to retrial where the jury
is unable to agree,22 where there is a possibility of juror bias' or one of
the jurors is disqualified,2 where necessary for tactical reasons in a mili-
tary campaign,25 or where the mistrial was declared in the sole interest
of the defendant.20
I It seems clear that where the termination is due to "a breakdown in
judicial machinery"2 7 there is no constitutional bar to reprosecution. 28
•18Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949).
1United States v. Jorn, 91 S. Ct. 547, 558 (1971).
2022 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
21Id. at 580.
-Keerl v. Montana, 213 U.S. 135 (1909); Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71
(1902); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892); United States v. Perez,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
2 Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891).
"Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271 (1894).
" Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949). A court-martial was convened by a
division of the Third Army, but rapid advancement into Germany rendered the
distance of the witnesses so great that its continuation became impractical. The
charges were then withdrawn and transmitted to the Fifteenth Army which con:
ducted a second court-martial. This was held not to violate the double jeopardy
provision of the fifth amendment.
2" Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961). The trial judge, on his own mo-
tion and for reasons not entirely clear, declared a mistrial. The Supreme Court,
inferring that the action was taken to forestall improper questioning by the prosecu-
tion, said that it was "unwilling, where it clearly appears that a mistrial has been
granted in the sole interest of the defendant, to hold that its necessary consequence
is to bar all retrial." Id. at 369.
"' Id. at 372 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"8See Note, 77 HAv. L. R-v., supra note 10, at 1276-81.
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Somerville represents a much more difficult situation because the mistrial
was declared at the request of the prosecution-due to its error-and over
the objection of the accused. It seems doubtful that this termination would
qualify under the "manifest necessity" rule outlined in Perez, especially
when the rule is taken with Justice Story's admonition: "[T]he power
[to discharge the jury] ought to be used With the greatest caution,
under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes ....,,9
The foregoing indicates that the Supreme Court could easily hold
Somerville's reprosecution invalid as an unconstitutional abridgment of
the fifth amendment double jeopardy prohibition. But to do so would over-
look the interest of society in the fair administration of justice. Though the
double jeopardy doctrine has been justified as safeguarding interests of
society, the accused, and the judicial system, 0 it is most often char-
acterized as a measure for the protection of the defendant:
The underlying idea ... is that the State with all its resources and
power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an
individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrass-
ment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing
state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility
that even though innocent he may be found guilty.31
Despite this emphasis, the Supreme Court recognized from the be-
ginning that the interests of public justice should be the determining factor
as to whether premature termination of a trial is permissible.3 2 "Where...
the ends of substantial justice cannot be attained without discontinuing the
trial, a mistrial may be declared.., and [the defendant] may be retried
consistently with the Fifth Amendment.133 United States v. Tateo4 dear-
ly recognizes that society has an interest in determining guilt and punish-
ing the guilty. 5
29 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 580. This view was reiterated in Downum in which the
Court quoted from an earlier opinion by Justice (then Judge) Story holding that
the power to discharge the jury before it reached a verdict was to be exercised
"'only in very extraordinary and striking circumstances."' 372 U.S. at 736,
quoting United States v. Coolidge, 25 F. Cas. 622, 623 (No. 14,858) (C.C.D. Mass.
1815).
"0 See Comment, Statutory Implementation of Double Jeopardy Clauses: New
Life for a Moribund Constitutional Guarantee, 65 YALE L.. 339, 340-41 (1956);
Note, 77 I-Hav. L. REv., supra note 10, at 1274.,' Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
82See text accompanying note 21 supra.
'3 Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 368 (1961).'377 U.S. 463 (1964).
" Id. at 466. "It would be a high price indeed for society to pay were every
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Once the need to consider the interests of both parties is recognized,
a balancing of these interests must inevitably follow. It is submitted that
the exact point of the attachment of jeopardy is of no moment and that
the controlling consideration when determining whether or not reprosecu-
tion of the defendant is permissible should be the overall interest of public
justice, properly evaluated, giving due consideration to both the rights
of the accused, and the interests of society. In a sense a defendant is
prejudiced from the moment suspicion focuses, and our heritage of sensi-
-tivity for the rights of the individual demands an acute awareness of this,
but the value of an adjudication of guilt on the merits must not be under-
estimated.Y
The policies underlying the double jeopardy provision of the Constitu-
tion were not sufficiently implicated in Somerville to preclude his re-
prosecution. Only two days had elapsed between the beginning of the first
trial and the reindictment. This was not a case of "repeated attempts
to convict... enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may
be found guilty," 37 nor was it a harassing maneuver. The prosecutor acted
in good faith at all times.
A holding that the discharge of a jury impaneled under an invalid in-
dictment automatically erects a double jeopardy bar to reprosecution could
force a useless proceeding at the expense of all concerned. Any attempt
by the prosecution to correct an indictment the validity of which came
under doubt after the seating of the jury would be discouraged, and any
doubts of the defense would be reserved as a ground upon which to seek
a new trial in the event of an unfavorable verdict."8 The result would be
a wasted initial effort in the event a later challenge to the validity of the
indictment was sustained. Many of the fears the double jeopardy protec-
tion seeks to shield the defendant from would be realized, i.e., the addi-
tional expense of an unnecessary proceeding and unduly prolonged em-
barrassment, anxiety, and insecurity.
The rule that jeopardy attaches when the jury is impaneled and sworn
accused granted immunity from punishment because of any defect sufficient to
constitute reversible error in the proceedings leading to conviction." Id. See also
United States v. Jorn, 91 S. Ct. 547, 554 (1971); Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684,
689 (1949).
" The defendant himself, in addition to society in general, has a positive interest
in having the question of his guilt settled by a determination on the merits.
' See text accompanying note 31 supra.
"Retrial would clearly have been permissible had the trial proceeded to its
conclusion and the defendant's challenge of the validity of the indictment been
sustained. See United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
19711
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.cannot, by necessity, preclude retrial in every instance where the jury
.is discharged prior to the verdict.3 9 If the rule is retained, as it appears
that it will be, there remains the necessity of determining under what
circumstances retrial is precluded.4" Under Perez, anytime the discharge is
necessary in the interest of public justice reprosecution is constitutionally
permissible. But society's interest in determining the guilt of an accused
"on the merits may be too easily subordinated to the rights of the accused
by a protective court. Care must be taken to see that these competing in-
terests are recognized and properly evaluated. Courts must see that re-
-trial following a discharge of the jury does not violate policies under-
girding the double jeopardy provision of the Constitution, but this deter-
mination must be made in light of the competing interests of society and
the accused, and in the overall interest of justice. Overzealous concern for
the rights of the defendant must not be allowed to present an "obstacle to
the administration of justice in many cases in which there is no semblance
of the type of oppressive practices at which the double-jeopardy prohibi-
tion is aimed."'
JoHN E. HODGE, JR.
Criminal Procedure-State Hearsay Exception for Co-conspirator's
Statement Held not to Violate Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
The hearsay rule,' because of its many exceptions,2 abounds with con-
troversy more than any other area in the law of evidence.' A particularly
"See United States v. Jorn, 91 S. Ct. 547, 554-55 (1971); SIGLER 74.° 'See United States v. Jorn, 91 S. Ct. 547, 554-55 (1971). It has been sug-
gested that the problem of attachment of jeopardy could be eliminated by the
adoption of the English rule which requires a final judgment of acquittal or con-
viction to constitute prior jeopardy. SIGLER 223.
" Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1949).
1 The hearsay rule has been defined as the exclusion "of testimony in court or
written evidence, of a statement made out of court, such statement being offered
as an assertion to show the truth of matters asserted therein, and this resting for
its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court assertion." C. McCORMICK, LAW
oF EVDIDECE § 225 (1954).
Historically there are several rationales for the rule, the most significant ones
being that the adversary should have full opportunity for cross-examination; that
testimony should be given under oath; that the trier of fact should have an
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness; and that errors in transmission
are nonexistent when the declarant is in court. Id. § 224.
2 Under the hearsay exceptions the courts have admitted into evidence out-of-
court statements to prove the truth of what was asserted. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 1420 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
3It has been estimated that the hearsay rule accounts for at least one third of
[Vol. 49
